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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The ability to convince an individual, through the art of honest persuasion, of the 
righteousness of a belief is celebrated, however, in failure of such persuasion, 
compelling that person to act contradictory to their retained ideal is detestable.  The 
free will to reject a movement or disagree with a practice is the sort of liberty this 
Nation was founded upon, yet today the potential exists that many in the 
pharmaceutical profession will be forced into behaviors repugnant to their basic 
standards of goodness and morality.  The proliferation of abortive and contraceptive 
drug therapies has thrust many pharmacists into roles as facilitators of practices they 
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oppose on fundamental levels without a corresponding ability to opt out of such 
action. 
When a patient desires drug therapies that, in the eyes of the pharmacist, are 
likely to destroy an unborn human life, the pro-life pharmacist is left in an unsettling 
position: accommodate the patient and breach basic moral principles or adhere to 
conscience and risk liability and disciplinary action.1  Unlike physicians and nurses, 
who are protected by legislation passed in the wake of abortion’s legalization,2 
pharmacists who follow their conscience by refusing to dispense controversial 
medications or referring to a willing pharmacist have no reliable legal or professional 
basis to prevent or rectify retaliatory action by employers, patients, and peers.3  
Solving this predicament is especially difficult in light of the pharmacist’s 
professional ethical duty to promote the patient’s best interests.4 
The purpose of this Note is not to argue for or against either the pro-life or pro-
choice positions.  The purpose of this Note is to shed light on a serious moral 
dilemma that faces many pharmacists today, to call for universal acceptance in the 
pharmacy profession of a right of conscience, and to suggest adequate state and 
national legislative measures that would protect and prevent pharmacists from 
having to act contrary to their basic moral convictions. 
Section I provides background regarding present day abortive and contraceptive 
drug therapies and the role of the pharmacist in providing such medications.  Section 
II is presented to provide some perspective and background as to moral belief 
regarding abortion and emergency contraception (EC) and how such a belief may 
conflict with a pharmacist’s professional duties.  The discussion of the tension 
between moral and professional duties illustrates that the beliefs regarding abortion 
and EC of the pharmacist who chooses conscience over professional duty are 
genuinely fundamental and deserve respect.  Section III illustrates the detrimental 
consequences that choosing conscience could wreak.  Section IV sheds light on the 
inadequacy of current common and statutory law that could feasibly protect the 
pharmacist’s moral convictions from retaliation or liability.  Finally, Section V 
proposes that professional pharmaceutical organizations lead the way to recognizing 
a true right of conscience, which would eventually result in universal legislation 
protecting against all potential ramifications of choosing conscience. 
II.  SECTION I: ANTI-REPRODUCTION PILLS AND THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE 
A.  The Pills 
On September 28, 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the 
drug mifepristone, formerly known as RU-486, for use in the United States as an 
abortifacient.5  Mifepristone had previously been approved and is currently used in 
                                                                
1See infra Section III. 
2See infra Section IV.C.  
3See infra Section IV. 
4See infra Section II.  
5U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS News, FDA Approves 
Mifepristone for the Termination of Early Pregnancy (Sept. 28, 2000), available at 
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some European countries, including France, England, and Sweden.6  Although 
mifepristone has other potential uses, such as postcoital contraception and daily-use 
birth control,7 its FDA approved use is as an early pregnancy abortifacient.8 
Mifepristone acts as an anti-hormone and precludes a woman’s uterus from 
retaining an implanted fertilized egg.9  The drug blocks progesterone, an essential 
hormone in the acceptance and retention of an implanted egg within a woman’s 
uterus; and, when taken in concurrence with misoprostol, induces a spontaneous 
abortion.10  The fact that the mifepristone abortion regimen acts to destroy an 
implanted egg as opposed to a fertilized yet not implanted egg, is what distinguishes 
it from emergency contraception.       
Drugs used post-coitally with the intent to prevent the development of a 
pregnancy are referred to as emergency contraception.11  This labeling as emergency 
contraception is a bit conclusory, as the definition of whether use of such drugs is 
contraception or abortion lies at the heart of the controversy over them.12  However, 
for purposes of convenience and clarity, this Note will refer to drug regimens 
consumed post-intercourse for the purpose of preventing the onset or continuance of 
pregnancy as emergency contraception (EC), as that is the term that has been 
attached to them in modern medical, social, and political arenas. 
Notwithstanding this controversy, the physical and biological effects of orally 
administered EC, often referred to as the morning-after pill, are not in dispute.  EC 
may prevent the development of a pregnancy by inhibiting any of four successive 
biological events, either pre or post fertilization, necessary to establish and maintain 
a pregnancy.13  EC works before fertilization by either suppressing ovulation, like 
regular birth-control pills, or preventing fertilization of an egg by inhibiting the 
movement of the sperm or the egg.14  If an egg becomes fertilized, then EC may 
disrupt transport of the fertilized egg to the uterus or, if the transport through the 
fallopian tube is complete, prevent the implantation of the fertilized egg in the 
woman’s uterus.15  EC is most effective when used up to seventy-two hours after 
                                                          
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/NEW00737.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter 
HHS News]. 
6Id. 
7Gwendolyn Prothro, RU 486 Examined: Impact of a New Technology on an Old 
Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 728 (1997).  
8See HHS News, supra note 5. 
9Prothro, supra note 7, at 724. 
10Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Mifepristone: A Brief History, at 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/ library/ABORTION/Mifepristone.html (last visited Jan. 2, 
2002) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood]. 
11AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, EMERGENCY 
CONTRACEPTION: THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE 1 (2000).  
12See infra Section II.  
13AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.  
14Id.; see also Jane E. Brody, Pregnancy Prevention, the Morning After, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
10, 2001 (Late Edition), at F8. 
15Id.   
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unprotected intercourse and becomes completely ineffective after implantation 
occurs, usually six or seven days after intercourse.16 
B.  The Pharmacist’s Role 
During the past twenty years emergency contraception pills (ECPs) have been 
available to and used by American women.17  During this time frame non-emergency 
oral contraceptives (those taken as a daily pre-intercourse regimen) were used off-
label as emergency contraception18 and were distributed as such “primarily in 
hospital emergency rooms, reproductive health clinics, and university health 
centers.”19  These medical facilities would repackage oral contraceptives for use as 
emergency contraception; pharmacies associated with certain clinics would 
repackage oral contraceptives into EC regimens and label them as such; and private 
physicians would instruct patients to take a larger dosage of their regular birth 
control pills as EC.20    
In 1998 the FDA approved the Preven Emergency Contraceptive Kit, an EC 
based on the Yuzpe regimen.21  In 1999, the FDA also approved Plan B, another EC 
regimen.22  While different regimens of oral contraceptives had been distributed and 
used before 1998 as emergency contraceptives, Preven and Plan B are the first 
regimens specifically approved by the FDA as safe and effective emergency 
contraceptives, to be packaged and marketed as such.23  Additionally, modified doses 
of oral contraceptives, not specifically packaged for use as an EC, can still be 
prescribed in doses that would effect emergency contraception if doctor and patient 
desire such a method.24 
Emergency contraception pills are classified as prescription drugs,25 and “states 
are delegated the power and responsibility of determining which health care 
professionals … have prescriptive authority.”26  Currently, many states have 
                                                                
16AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1, 4.  
17AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.  
18Heather M. Field, Increasing Access to Emergency Contraceptive Pills Through State 
Law Enabled Dependent Pharmacist Prescribers, 11 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 147 (2000). 
19AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. 
20Renee C. Wyser-Pratte, Protection of RU-486 as Contraception, Emergency 
Contraception and as an Abortifacient Under the Law of Contraception, 79 OR. L. REV. 1121, 
1135 (2000). 
21AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.  The 
Yuzpe regimen was the first EC drug formulation and was described by Albert Yuzpe and 
colleagues in 1974.  Id.at 1.  
22Id. at 2.  
23Id.  
24Id. at 6.  
25Id. at 2; see generally Field, supra note 18. 
26See Field, supra note 18, at 223-24 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1994)).    
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authorized collaborative practices that have expanded the role of pharmacists.27  
These collaborative practices generally authorize greater independence of the 
pharmacist to initiate drug therapies not specifically prescribed by a patient’s 
physician or other authorized health care professional.28  In other words, some 
patients may not require a prescription from their doctor before being distributed 
certain medications or drugs from a pharmacist.  However, with the exception of 
Washington, California, and Alaska,29 states do not authorize this expanded 
pharmacist role in the distribution of ECPs.  Pharmacists are generally limited to 
dispensing ECPs specifically prescribed by some other authorized health care 
professional.  Other general duties of a pharmacist in the distribution of ECPs may 
include counseling and educating women on EC use at the time the prescription is 
filled.30 
In Washington, California, and Alaska, pharmacists have the dual authority to 
prescribe and dispense ECPs under each state’s respective collaborative practices.31  
Generally speaking, the pharmacist may dispense ECPs in accordance with 
“standardized procedures or protocols developed by the pharmacist and an 
authorized prescriber[.]”32  Thus, a woman need not receive authorization from her 
doctor prior to buying ECPs; the pharmacist acts not as a third party or indirect 
provider of ECPs, but as a direct provider in accordance with a general collaborative 
protocol. 
If pro-choice groups and the American Medical Association have their way, 
pharmacists will have no future role in ECPs.  This is because these groups support 
an FDA reclassification of ECPs as over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, rather than 
prescription.33  Many pro-choice groups claim as a top goal the persuasion of the 
FDA to reclassify ECPs as OTC.34  If OTC status were granted, then “women would 
be able to get ECPs without encountering any type of health care provider.”35 
                                                                
27Id. at 226.  The expansion of pharmacist’s authority may include “1) the administration 
of immunizations/vaccines; 2) substitution power for prescribed drugs or some degree of 
selection power of particular drugs for certain conditions; and 3) patient-specific or general 
drug therapy management.” Id.  
28Id. at 229-30.  
29Heidi Welborn, Expanding the Pharmacist’s Role in Providing Emergency 
Contraception, 41 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N 767 (2001).  
30AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 10.  
31Welborn, supra note 29, at 767; see also Field, supra note 18, at 231-32 (citing 
Washington state statutes and regulations that authorize pharmacist to prescribe ECPs); CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4052(8) (West 1996) (California statute authorizing pharmacist 
prescriptive power over ECPs). 
32CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4052(8).  
33See Welborn, supra note 29, at 768. 
34Cheryl Wetzstein, In an Emergency; Advocates Push Access to 72-Hour Birth Control, 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at A2 (citing groups such as Advocates for Youth, Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, and the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action 
League). 
35Field, supra note 18, at 200.  
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OTC status for ECPs is not generally supported by pharmacists however,36 and is 
not likely in today’s political climate.  Advocates on both sides of the issue believe 
the Bush administration, with its influence on the FDA, will delay or negate a switch 
in classification from prescription to OTC.37  The behavioral and social policy 
concerns raised by ECPs38 “may make switching ECPs to OTC status a politically 
unpopular move.”39  In any event, ECPs are currently available only by prescription. 
Many restrictions have been imposed by the FDA in the use and distribution of 
mifepristone.  First, the drug can only be used during the first forty-nine days after a 
woman’s last menstrual cycle.40  Also, the drug is distributed to women directly from 
doctors and certain health clinics.41  Mifepristone “is not and will not be available in 
pharmacies[.]”42  Thus, under the current FDA restrictions, pharmacists have no role 
in mifepristone-induced abortions. 
While current mifepristone use is much lower than expected since its FDA 
approval and subsequent availability to the public,43 some signals suggest that future 
use or access may become more widespread.  A survey of doctors by the Kaiser 
Family Foundation discovered that twenty-three percent of doctors said they were 
“likely” to offer mifepristone in 2002; up from the seven percent that actually 
provided the drug since its approval.44  Also, health centers offering mifepristone 
have reported a ninety-nine percent rate of abortion in women who have taken the 
drug.45  An expected increase in availability, a near perfect rate of achieving the 
desired ends of abortion, together with continued efforts by pro-choice groups, such 
                                                                
36See Welborn, supra note 29, at 768. 
37Doug Thomas, After Sex Pill Gets New Push, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 20, 2001, at 
1 (quoting representatives of Planned Parenthood and Metro Right to Life, both of whom 
believe OTC status is not forthcoming in the near future).   
38OTC status may magnify controversial issues such as promiscuity, sexually transmitted 
diseases, availability of counseling and health care, and the abortion/contraception 
controversy.  Field, supra note 18, at 204.  
39Id. at 204. 
40U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
Mifepristone Questions and Answers, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/mifepristone/ 
mifepristone-qa.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002) [hereinafter FDA]. 
41See HHS News, supra note 5.  Only doctors and other health care providers that meet 
certain qualifications mandated by the FDA may distribute mifepristone.  Some of these 
required qualifications include the ability to determine the duration of the woman’s pregnancy 
and provide surgical abortion in the case the drug regimen fails to procure an abortion.    
42See FDA, supra note 40.  
43See Julia Duin, Just 7% of U.S. Doctors Prescribe Abortion Pill, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2001, at A3.  Only six percent of gynecologists and one percent of family practice doctors 
surveyed prescribed the drug since its approval.  Id.  
44Evan Henderson, Abortion Pill Not yet a Frequent Choice, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov. 
12, 2001, at L6.  
45One Year After Approval of Mifepristone, Planned Parenthood Reports Widespread 
Satisfaction Among Patients and Providers, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 24, 2001, 2001 WL 
21898499 [hereinafter Planned Parenthood II]. 
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as Planned Parenthood, to increase accessibility to abortion,46 could be the impetus to 
pharmaceutical distribution of mifepristone in the future. 
FDA approval of mifepristone and ECPs, such as Preven and Plan B, has made 
drug related reproductive therapy a real and potentially widespread option for 
women.  Marketing campaigns by women’s and abortion-rights groups and the drug 
manufacturers themselves will further introduce these drug options to women.  This 
drug therapy revolution of sorts has expanded the pharmacist’s role in the provision 
of emergency contraception, and perhaps, in the future, the provision of 
mifepristone. 
The more women that are aware of and desire EC, the more involved and 
important pharmacists will become in the contraception process.  One can imagine 
that if more and more states adopt the liberal EC distribution procedures of 
Washington and California, then pharmacists would become the primary providers of 
ECPs.  And if mifepristone distribution restrictions are relaxed, pharmacists could 
feasibly become key players in the furnishing of abortion drugs as well.  Whether 
they like it or not, pharmacists are being thrust into the role of common, everyday 
providers of controversial reproductive medications47, and this position may put 
some pharmacists in the predicament of having to choose between their moral 
convictions regarding EC and abortion and the patient’s wishes.  
III.  SECTION II: THE NATURE OF THE MORAL DILEMMA 
This section entails examining the rationale of believing abortion and EC are 
morally wrong accompanied by an examination of the nature of a pharmacist’s 
ethical obligation to her patients.48  Understanding these competing interests allows 
us to better appreciate that the serious pharmacist who chooses conscience over 
professional duty is surely abiding by a fundamental tenet in her life; fundamental 
principles such as these must be protected, not punished. 
A.  Abortion Viewpoints 
The mere mention of abortion can instill passion into any argument unlike any 
modern day controversy.  Whether or not a woman’s Constitutional right to abortion 
is affirmed for all time, unified agreement on the morality (or immorality) of the 
procedure of terminating a pregnancy will certainly never be reached.  However, 
even those who defend the right to abortion believe “that it is intrinsically a bad 
thing, a kind of cosmic shame, when a human life at any stage is deliberately 
extinguished.”49  People have a general agreement about the sanctity of unborn 
human life.50 
                                                                
46See id.  The President of Planned Parenthood was quoted as stating that her organization 
“will continue to work to expand availability of [mifepristone] and other advances in 
reproductive health care[.]”   
47See supra Section II.  
48In this section the terms “ethical” and “professional” are used synonymously.  
49RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 91-92 (1993). 
50Frances M. Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 160, 164 (1995) (book review); Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life, 
103 YALE L.J. 2049, 2070 (1994) (book review and critique of LIFE’S DOMINION). 
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Thus, the controversy arises when weighing unborn life against the life of the 
would-be mother.51  Varying convictions regarding the morality of abortion emerge 
dependant upon how each individual person weighs the natural and human 
“investments” in unborn life against the toll on the natural and human “investments” 
in the woman that childbirth would bring.52  Abortion proponents, while recognizing 
the sanctity of unborn life, give priority to the woman’s life53 in varying 
circumstances.54  Thus, abortion proponents say, while abortion has “negative moral 
significance,” it is, on the whole, morally justified in light of the woman’s life.55 
However, opponents of abortion believe that it is wrong in all or most 
circumstances at any point during a pregnancy.56  Some abortion opponents base this 
belief on the premise that unborn life is human with a fundamental right to continued 
life, and thus abortion is morally unjustified in all circumstances.57  Most opponents 
base their belief on the premise that the sanctity of unborn life, while having no 
rights itself, always outweighs the woman’s life, except in extreme circumstances, 
such as rape.58  As abortion proponents recognize the sanctity of the fetus, abortion 
opponents recognize the values sacrificed and difficulties encountered by denying 
abortion.59  However, opponents “proclaim … that none of these reasons can ever 
objectively confer the right to dispose of another’s life, even when that life is only 
beginning”; and further that “[l]ife is too fundamental a value to be weighed against 
even very serious disadvantages.”60 
                                                                
51See Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2050. 
52Id. at 2070.  
53This word is used with respect to the woman’s lifestyle and general happiness, not 
necessarily as a reference to the life or death of the woman. 
54See Kamm, supra note 50, at 164; Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2069-70. 
55Kamm, supra note 50, at 164; Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2070. 
56The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured 
Abortion, ¶ 17, (Nov. 18, 1974), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ 
congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19741118_declaration-abortion_en.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Declaration on Procured Abortion]. 
57See generally id.  
58Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2070.  Dworkin argues that most abortion opponents do not 
believe that fetuses are “babies” with rights and interests.  The argument, quite simply, is this: 
fetuses are, at least in the early and middle stages of pregnancy unconscious beings.  Only 
sentient beings have “rights and interests.”  Thus, fetuses themselves have no rights or 
interests.  Most abortion opponents must then have a “detached objection” to abortion – one 
that does not presuppose a fetus to have rights and interests.  For Dworkin, this must be true to 
rationalize the rape and “life of the mother” exceptions of most abortion opponents.  See id. at 
2055-56.     
59See Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 56, ¶ 14. 
60Id. Of course, there are those abortion opponents who allow for exceptions in extreme 
circumstances such as rape.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Emergency Contraception: Abortion? 
The current debate over mifepristone is one of access and opportunity – abortion 
opponents see the approval of mifepristone as a more accessible and convenient 
method of abortion.  No debate exists over whether mifepristone acts as an 
abortifacient.  Thus, the above viewpoints on the morality of abortion clearly apply 
to the use and provision of mifepristone.  However, the morality of ECPs in the 
abortion context is not as clear.  The ambiguity of whether ECPs fit into the abortion 
debate is a result of a separate, yet related, question: when human life begins.  For if 
life does not begin until the fertilized egg becomes implanted in the woman’s uterus, 
then ECPs do not effect an abortion.61  But, for those that believe that life 
commences at fertilization, then ECPs, with their potential to destroy a fertilized egg, 
effect an abortion.  The question of when life begins has given rise to a debate within 
a debate: assuming abortion is immoral, is EC abortion? – that is, does life begin at 
fertilization or implantation?  Science and the Roman Catholic Church62 offer some 
guidance on the issue, however inconsistent and convoluted. 
1.  The Science of Life’s Beginnings: The Impetus to the Debate 
The fertilization of a woman’s egg, occurring after intercourse, is “the merger of 
egg and sperm into a genetically complete entity.”63  First, the sperm must capacitate, 
a process not thoroughly understood by the medical community, which entails the 
sperm’s “acquisition of fertilizing ability through exposure to the female 
reproductive tract.”64  Capacitation takes approximately five to six hours.65  Then, 
once the sperm and egg, which each have twenty-three chromosomes, “have 
combined those chromosomes into a single 46-chromosone nucleus” fertilization is 
complete.66  This combination process takes approximately twelve hours.67   Thus, 
the fertilization process, which takes place in the fallopian tube, is complete 
approximately seventeen to eighteen hours after intercourse, and mitotic divisions of 
the fertilized egg commence.68  The fertilized egg is called a zygote.69 
The zygote remains in the fallopian tube for three to four days, where cleavage – 
mitotic divisions of the zygote into multiple cells  - occurs and continues through the 
                                                                
61See supra Section I. 
62As the Roman Catholic Church has been an impassioned protector of the unborn, 
discussion of religious teachings and traditions on life’s beginnings is limited to those of the 
Roman Catholic Church.  A discussion of other denomination’s beliefs is beyond the scope of 
this note. 
63Elizabeth Spahn and Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in 
Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F.L REV. 261, 293 (1998).   
64LUIGI MASTROIANNI, JR., EPILOGUE TO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
VITRO 356 (Luigi Mastroianni, Jr. & John D. Biggers eds., 1981).  
65Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 293.  
66STUART IRA FOX, HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY 618 (4th ed. 1993). 
67Id. 
68Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 293.  
69Id.  
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implantation process.70  The zygote travels through the fallopian tube to the uterus 
(where it becomes a morula).71  Once in the uterus, the morula “floats” in suspension 
and, after approximately three days, implants itself into the uterine wall (and is called 
a blastocyst).  Thus, implantation occurs about seven days after intercourse.72 
The American Medical Association (AMA) equates conception, and in effect the 
beginning of life, with the implantation of the blastocyst in the woman’s uterus.73  
This theory is in accord with various medical dictionaries’ definitions of 
conception.74   
2.  The Teachings of the Roman Catholic Church 
The Roman Catholic Church’s official teaching and belief is that life begins, and 
conception occurs, at fertilization.75  Fusing science and religion, the Roman 
Catholic Church claims confirmation of its belief from modern genetics, in that “the 
program of what this living being will be” is established from “the first instant.”76  
The Roman Catholic Church recognizes a distinction between life’s commencement 
and the moment of “ensoulment” – when the body and soul fuse.77  However, a 
unanimous tradition on when ensoulment occurs does not exist.78  Both Saint 
Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas taught that ensoulment occurred forty to 
eighty days after conception, not at the instant of conception,79 and current authors 
are still in disagreement.80  Nevertheless, that the moment of human life, with or 
without soul, commences at fertilization is not in dispute within the Church.81  
                                                                
70ARTHUR C. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 1033-34 (9th ed. 1996). 
71Id.  At this point the morula is a mass of sixteen to thirty-two cells. Id.; see also HUMAN 
PHYSIOLOGY 675 (Arthur J. Vander et al. eds., 6th ed. 1993)).  
72HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY, supra note 71, at 677; ELAINE N. MARIEB, ESSENTIALS OF HUMAN 
ANATOMY & PHYSIOLOGY 480 (4th ed. 1994). 
73Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 294.  
74See id. at 333 n.205 (citing SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL 
DICTIONARY 131 (Supp. 1992) (defining conception as “the onset of pregnancy, marked by 
implantation of the blastocyst”); ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, AND 
ALLIED HEALTH 258 (3rd ed. 1983) (defining conception as “the onset of pregnancy, marked 
by implantation of the blastocyst; the formation of a viable zygote”); 1 OXFORD COMPANION 
TO MEDICINE 254 (1986) (defining conception as “the fertilization of an ovum by a 
spermatozoon and the implantation of the resulting zygote”)); but see infra note 83.   
75
“From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the 
father nor of the mother, it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth.”  
Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 56, ¶ 12.  
76Id. ¶ 13.  
77See id. ¶ 13 n.19.  
78See id.   
79
 See Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 270-71.  
80Id.  
81Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 56, ¶ 13 n.19.  
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Further, recognition of abortion, even before ensoulment, as a grave fault was and is 
unanimous.82 
While not all abortion opponents are Catholic, the Church’s teachings have 
resonated with many Americans.83  Most people believe abortion is morally wrong 
most of the time.84  Some of the people opposed to abortion are pharmacists.85  And 
even more importantly, some pharmacists believe life begins at fertilization, and thus 
find EC to be an early form of abortion.86  The pharmacist who holds these principals 
dearly will face the dilemma of having to choose between her conscience and her 
professional duties. 
C.  The Pharmacist’s Professional Ethical Obligations 
Pharmacy is a profession, and much like the professions of medicine and law, 
entails a duty to assure and promote the patient’s best interests.87  As professionals, 
pharmacists are expected to give priority to the patient’s interests over their own 
immediate interests.88  As key players in the implementation of drug therapies, 
pharmacists are expected to withhold drugs “from those who have no authority to use 
them” and not to withhold “medications from those who do have authority to use 
them.”89   
The patient’s best interests are the pharmacist’s primary commitment and 
concern.  Among other things, pharmacists are expected to “help individuals achieve 
optimum benefit from their medications, to be committed to their welfare, and to 
                                                                
82Id. ¶  7. 
83See Cheryl Wetzstein, Advocates of Emergency Contraception have Begun a Campaign 
Designed to Expand Access to 72-Hour Birth Control Pills, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 4, 
2002, 2002 WL 8338126.  The presidents of two different organizations, Life Issues Institute 
and American Life League “maintain[] that medical groups are wrong when they say 
pregnancy begins after implantation in the womb” and thus ECPs are “very, very early 
abortive drug[s].”  Id.  The article also states that over 100 doctors “have signed a statement 
questioning federal designation of EC as ‘contraception.’”  Id.    
84See Public Agenda, Abortion: Major Proposals, at http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/ 
pcc_detail.cfm?issue_type=abortion&list=2 (last visited Feb. 20, 2002) (a public opinion poll 
by a nonprofit, bipartisan organization).  The question: is abortion morally wrong most of the 
time?  Fifty-five percent polled answered yes. Thirty percent answered no.  Id.  
85See, e.g., Pharmacists for Life International, at http://www.pfli.org/main. 
php?pfi=aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) [hereinafter PFLI].  Pharmacists for Life 
International (PFLI) is the only exclusively pro-life pharmacy association.  It represents 
almost 1500 pharmacists, and hundreds of lay supporters worldwide.  Id.  
86Id.   
87William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the 
Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 5 J. PHARMACY & LAW 1 (1996).  
88Stephanie E. Harvey, EiLun Lu, Oscar Rivas, & Julie Rodgers, Do Pharmacists Have 
the Right to Refuse to Dispense a Prescription Based on Personal Beliefs?, at http://www.nm-
pharmacy.com/body_rights.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Harvey].  
89Allen & Brushwood, supra note 87, at 2.  
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maintain their trust”90; to place “concern for the well-being of the patient at the 
center of professional practice” taking into consideration the “needs stated by the 
patient”;91 and to hold “the patient’s welfare paramount.”92  Further, patient 
autonomy and “personal and cultural differences among patients” must be respected 
by the pharmacist.93  These professional duties, and others, encompass the 
“collective conscience” of the pharmaceutical profession, and their implementation 
by each pharmacist is considered a moral obligation.94   
When presented with a validly authorized prescription for a legal medication, by 
a patient aware of the risks involved in taking the medication, and for whom the 
medication would be reasonably safe, the aforementioned principles and 
expectations leave the pharmacist with an ethical duty to fill and dispense the 
prescription.95  The duty to dispense in these circumstances may give rise to a serious 
conflict between the pharmacist’s personal conviction concerning abortion and her 
professional duty to the patient. 
In 1998, the American Pharmaceutical Association (APhA), and subsequently 
various other pharmaceutical organizations, eased the conflict between personal and 
professional morals by adopting policies recognizing a pharmacist’s right to refuse 
dispensing medications based on the pharmacist’s personal beliefs.96  However, if the 
pharmacist exercises her right of conscience and refuses to fill the prescription, the 
duty to the patient is not extinguished, and could be fulfilled by referring the patient 
to another pharmacist or distributor. 97  In any event, “the patient should not be 
required to abide by the pharmacist’s personal, moral decision.”98  For many 
pharmacists, a referral would be no more than passive participation in the activity 
                                                                
90American Pharmaceutical Association, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, available at 
http://www.aphanet.org/pharmcare/ethics.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Code of 
Ethics]. 
91Id.  
92American Pharmaceutical Association, Principles of Practice for Pharmaceutical Care, 
available at http://www.aphanet.org/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2002). 
93Code of Ethics, supra note 90.  
94American Pharmaceutical Association, 1997-98 Policy Committee Report, Pharmacist 
Conscience Clause, available at http://www.aphanet.org/lead/committee2.html (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Committee Report]. 
95Id.; Harvey, supra note 88. 
96American Pharmaceutical Association, Report of the House Delegates, Subject: 
Pharmacist Conscience Clause, available at http://www.aphanet.org/lead/hod.html (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Conscience Clause].  “APhA recognizes the individual 
pharmacist’s right to exercise conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems 
to ensure patient access to legally prescribed therapy without compromising the pharmacist’s 
right of conscientious refusal.”   
97Committee Report, supra note 94. 
98Id. 
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they initially refused to actively assist.99  Thus the dilemma, while transformed into 
whether to refer or not, is equally troublesome to the pharmacist.  
IV.  SECTION III: THE POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CHOOSING CONSCIENCE 
The pharmacist who ultimately decides that her moral convictions regarding 
abortion outweigh her professional obligation to the patient may refuse to fill the 
prescription and refer the patient to another pharmacist; or, the pharmacist with 
conscientious objection may refuse to dispense and refuse to refer.  While the former 
decision will, in practical terms, shield the pharmacist from most negative 
consequences, the latter decision could have serious implications for the pharmacist, 
including employment termination or demotion, civil tort liability, or disciplinary 
action from the state pharmacy board. 
A.  Employment Ramifications 
A pharmacist who follows her conscience may be terminated or demoted by her 
employer.  The employment-at-will rule provides the employer with great leeway in 
terminating or demoting a pharmacist: employment may be terminated or diminished 
for any or no reason.100  Because of the immediate low cost and convenience to the 
employer, termination or demotion is probably the most likely and frequent 
detriment to a pharmacist who chooses to follow her conscience. 
The ongoing story of Karen Brauer is an illustration of this possibility.  Ms. 
Brauer, a pro-life pharmacist who believes EC is an early form of abortion, often 
turned away prescriptions for EC regimens during her employment at a large 
commercial pharmacy.101  On one occasion, a patient came to the pharmacy with a 
valid prescription refill for Micronor, an oral contraceptive that may be used as EC, 
and Ms. Brauer turned the patient away in accordance with her conscience.102  The 
patient complained, and when Ms. Brauer refused to agree to fill all legal 
prescriptions in the future, including EC regimens, the employer-pharmacy fired 
her.103     
B.  Tort Liability 
A pharmacist, as a professional, has a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
practicing her profession.104  The standard of care required to satisfy this duty varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and is adopted and applied based on various 
sources.105  All jurisdictions require technical accuracy in the administration of 
                                                                
99See Carol Ukens, Duty vs. Conscience: R.Ph.s Who Refuse to Dispense Raise Ethical 
Concerns, DRUG TOPICS, November 3, 1997, at 54.  
100Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 653 (2000). 
101Karen Brauer, Pharmacy Has a Conscience Problem, at http://www.gargaro.com/ 
kmart.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Brauer].  
102Id. 
103Id.  
104See, e.g., Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).  
105Some of these sources include national organizations such as the American 
Pharmaceutical Association, federal statutes and regulations, state statutes and regulations, and 
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prescriptions.106  This includes assuring “the patient receives the correct drug, 
dosage, and directions for use.”107  Other standards may supplement accuracy and 
require the exercise of the pharmacist’s independent judgment, including being alert 
for clear errors or mistakes in the prescription,108 which would implicate a duty to 
verify the prescription with the physician or to refuse to fill the prescription.109  Some 
jurisdictions require the pharmacist to warn the patient of potential risks or dangers 
that taking the drug entails.110 
When the pharmacist refuses to dispense and then refers, if she has given a good 
faith referral, she has probably satisfied reasonable care.111  Further, because the 
patient ultimately received the pharmaceutical care desired, legal action would 
probably not be initiated or appropriate.112  If the pharmacist neither dispenses nor 
refers, whether the pharmacist satisfied her duty of reasonable care in unclear and the 
chance of “injury” to the patient is increased. 
Whether the pharmacist may be liable depends first on whether a duty has been 
breached – that is, whether refusing to fill a prescription and refusing to refer 
breaches the duty of reasonable care.113  A pharmacist’s lack of accommodation to a 
woman seeking ECPs or abortion drugs may be considered a breach of duty under 
the failure to accurately administer prescription cases.114  In Troppi v. Scarf,115 the 
pharmacist filled the patient’s prescription with a tranquilizer rather than the birth 
control called for by the prescription,116 and this was held to be a breach of the 
                                                          
disciplinary decisions of state pharmacy boards.  See David W. Hepplewhite, A Traditional 
Legal Analysis of the Roles and Duties of Pharmacists, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 519 passim (1996).  
106See, e.g., DeCorda v. State, 878 P.2d 73, 76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Baker v. Arbor 
Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, 
Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1971); see generally, R. Paul Asbury, Comment, Pharmacist Liability: The 
Doors of Litigation Are Opening, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 907, 909-912 (2000); David B. 
Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal Responsibilities of Pharmacists: Should 
‘Can’ Imply ‘Ought’?, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 439, 444 (1996). 
107Asbury, supra note 106, at 910. 
108See, e.g., Nichols v. Cent. Merch., Inc., 817 P.2d 1131 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); Gassen v. 
E. Jefferson G. Hosp., 628 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App. 1993).  
109See, e.g., Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1994).  
110See, e.g., Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc. 880 P.2d 1129 (Arizona Ct. 
App. 1994); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).   
111See Conscience Clause, supra note 96; see also supra Section II.C.  
112Of course, one could imagine a situation in which, because of the referral, medication is 
not used in a timely fashion, and injury ensues, e.g., ECPs are not used within the seventy-two 
hour window.  In a situation such as this, the discussion that follows would apply. 
113Laura W. Smalley, Annotation, Cause of Action Against Pharmacist for Injury of Death 
Caused by Prescription Drugs, 13 Causes of Action 2d. 91 § 5 (2001).  
114See supra note 106.  
115187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).  
116Id. at 512.  
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pharmacist’s duty of care.117  The inaccurately filled prescription was a proximate 
cause of the ensuing pregnancy and birth of child.118 
Women seeking ECPs or abortion drugs may analogize a refusal to fill a 
prescription with prescriptions inaccurately filled, as in Troppi, in that the end result 
is the same – the patient does not receive the desired and authorized medication and 
thus pregnancy or child birth ensues.  Further, it will be difficult for the pharmacist 
to defend on the ground that the refusal was an exercise of reasonable independent 
judgment, as those cases entail refusal on the ground that the prescription had an 
error or mistake,119 or doubt existed as to whether the physician intended to prescribe 
the medication.120  Here, the only ground for refusal to fill and refer is the 
pharmacist’s personal disapproval of the morality of the medication, which could be 
considered an unreasonable omission under the current accepted practice of the 
profession.  Thus, a woman could reasonably argue that the refusal to fill a valid 
prescription on moral grounds is a breach of duty. 
In Troppi, the woman who was administered the wrong drugs by the negligent 
pharmacist sued on account of and was compensated for the harms of pregnancy and 
childbirth, which may include medical and hospital expenses and pain and 
suffering.121  Many jurisdictions recognize these injuries as the basis of claims often 
referred to as wrongful birth, wrongful pregnancy, or wrongful conception.122  
Further, a very few courts recognize a limited cause of action for wrongful life, a 
claim on behalf of the infant for the injury of being born.123  Most of these wrongful 
birth, pregnancy, conception, or life cases involve the acts or omissions of the 
woman’s physician.  However, as Troppi illustrates, pharmacists may also be liable 
for these injuries.  A pharmacist’s refusal to dispense ECPs or other abortion drugs 
or refer to a willing pharmacist could lead to potentially actionable injuries to the 
woman.  The woman may become pregnant, and an abortion or childbirth could 
ensue and the injuries and losses associated thereto could be the basis of a civil 
action.  Or the woman might hastily search for another pharmacist who was willing 
to dispense the desired birth control, and thus incur emotional pain and suffering in 
light of the stress of potentially not taking the drugs within the required timeframe.  
All of these ramifications of the pharmacist’s refusal to accommodate the patient 
could potentially be the basis of a civil action.124 
In any event, the real possibility of pharmacist liability for not dispensing or 
accommodating a woman who wants ECPs or other abortion drugs exists.  The 
                                                                
117Id. at 513.  
118Id.  
119See e.g., People’s Service Drug Stores v. Somerville, 158 A. 12, 14 (Maryland 1932).  
120See e.g., Eldridge, 485 N.E.2d 551, 554.  
121Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 513.   
122See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth, or Conception §§ 92-93 
(2001).  
123Id. § 98.  
124See supra Section III.B. 
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pharmacist must feel safe in following her conscience, and not feel threatened by 
potential litigation and liability. 
C.  Disciplinary Action 
The practice of pharmacy is a profession regulated and controlled by the state 
through designated statutes and regulations under such statutes.125  The responsibility 
of enforcing the state’s pharmacy acts is often delegated to a statutorily created 
board,126 which may be authorized to grant a license to practice pharmacy and 
discipline a pharmacist for certain acts or omissions.127   
Each state’s statute and regulations generally designate the offenses for which a 
pharmacist may be subject to disciplinary action, and further what action the state 
board may take against the pharmacist.  For example, in Ohio the state board “may 
revoke, suspend, limit, place on probation, or refuse to grant or renew an 
identification card [license], or may impose a monetary penalty[.]”128  The Ohio 
statute sets out the offenses for which such disciplinary action may be taken,129 and 
further authorizes the state board to adopt rules necessary to carry out the purposes 
of and enforce the statute.130  Gross immorality, dishonesty, dispensing drugs without 
a valid prescription, and the like are some of the offenses that could result in 
disciplinary action by a state board.131  Most disciplinary action involves 
“misconduct only with drug diversion and pharmacist impairment issues, but not 
with standard of care issues.”132  Further, no state’s pharmacy rules, whether 
statutory or administrative, include an obligation to fill valid prescriptions.133 
Thus, it seems unlikely that a state board would take any disciplinary action 
against a pharmacist for refusing to fill and refer a valid prescription.  However, as 
the controversy is new and yet untested, the possibility of disciplinary action may 
exist in some states.  In fact the Executive Director of the National Association of 
Boards of Pharmacy (NABP)134 has recognized the possibility of a “very small 
                                                                
125See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 76 (1996).  
126See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 76 (1996); see also OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4729.02 (Anderson 2001); Id. § 4729.25. 
127See, e.g., 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 76; see also OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4729.16.  
128OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.16.  
129Id. 
130Id. § 4729.26.  
131See, e.g., id. 4729.16(A)(1)-(2), (C)(3); see generally 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and 
Controlled Substances § 76 (1996).   
132Hepplewhite, supra note 105, at 544.  
133See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4729-5 et seq.; see also Harvey, supra note 88; e-mail 
from William T. Winsley, Executive Director, Ohio State Board of Pharmacy, to author 
(January 2, 2002). 
134For more information, see http://www.nabp.net. 
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minority” of state boards that may initiate disciplinary proceedings against a 
pharmacist who refuses to fill a valid prescription because of personal convictions.135  
V.  SECTION IV: THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT PROTECTIONS OF A  
PHARMACIST’S CONSCIENCE 
Various legal avenues are available to a pharmacist who is discriminated against 
due to her conscientious refusal to dispense abortion drugs.  Religious discrimination 
and wrongful discharge claims are the most obvious options for a discharged or 
demoted pharmacist.  Also, current state conscience clause statutes exist that 
generally protect choosing conscience.  However, the current legal remedies offer 
incomplete, uncertain, costly, and time-consuming protection, if any. 
A.  Religious Discrimination 
Under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964136, employers may not 
“refuse to hire … discharge … or otherwise discriminate against any individual … 
because of such individual’s … religion.”137  Further, an individual’s religion 
“includes all aspects of religious observance and practice … unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s … 
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.”138  As opposition to abortion is often based on religion,139 it 
falls within the ambit of Title VII protection.140 
However, in practical terms, Title VII does not offer guaranteed protection in the 
context of protecting a pharmacist’s conscience.141  Although the employer must 
make reasonable accommodations in light of the pharmacist’s abortion position,142 if 
an accommodation places an undue hardship on the employer’s business, the 
employer will not be culpable under Title VII for not implementing it.143  Further, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted undue hardship as any “greater than de minimus cost 
or imposition upon” the employer’s business, including co-workers.144 
                                                                
135Uken, supra note 94 (quoting Carmen Catizone, Executive Director of the National 
Association of the Boards of Pharmacy). 
136See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994).  
137Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
138Id. § 2000e(j). 
139See supra Section II.B.1.  
140See W. Cole Durham, et al., Accomodation of Conscientious Objection to Abortion: A 
Case Study of the Nursing Profession, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 253, 295-96 (1982). 
141See Allen and Brushwood, supra note 87, at 8-9. 
142§ 2000e(j). 
143Id.  
144Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)).  
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In Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital145, an Orthodox Jewish pharmacist 
claimed that because of his faith, he could not work on the Sabbath, sunset Friday 
through sunset Saturday, or various religious holidays.146  All of the plaintiff-
proposed accommodations were rejected as placing an undue hardship on the 
employer’s business.147  These proposals included hiring additional substitute 
pharmacists, having the pharmacy director work the plaintiff’s shifts, operating 
without the plaintiff-pharmacist, or having the pharmacy director order other current 
employees to trade shifts with the plaintiff.148  The first three proposals had the 
obvious burden of increasing costs and decreasing efficiency.149  Requiring 
employees to trade shifts with the plaintiff was disrupting work-routines and 
lowering the morale among the co-workers,150 and had the effect of discriminating 
“against some employees in order to enable others to observe” their religion.151 
In the context of a pharmacist’s conscientious objection to abortion drugs, many 
of the potential accommodations are analogous to those suggested and rejected in 
Brener.  Assuming a pharmacy adopts a policy of providing service to all customers 
for any valid, legal prescription, any accommodation to the objecting pharmacist 
probably would result in an undue burden on the employer.  For example, a 
pharmacy may only require one pharmacist on duty during certain shifts, and when 
the objecting pharmacist is scheduled for the “one pharmacist” shift, trading shifts is 
not an option because the times when the objecting pharmacist will “observe” her 
religion by refusing to fill prescriptions of abortion drugs are likely unknown.  
Further, having an additional pharmacist on duty only during the objecting 
pharmacist’s shift (in order to handle any objectionable prescription) would clearly 
result in economic loss, and thus be an undue burden.152  Also, never scheduling the 
objecting pharmacist during the “one pharmacist” shift could result in lowering co-
worker morale and disruption of work routines, both considered undue burdens.153  
A pharmacy that always has more than one pharmacist on duty during each shift, 
thus requiring other pharmacists besides the objecting pharmacist to handle 
prescriptions of abortion drugs, could also lead to a lowering of morale, and thus be 
an undue burden.154  Pharmacists in general do not appreciate having technically 
challenging prescriptions pawned off to them by other pharmacists; passing morally 
controversial prescriptions to another pharmacist could breed a similar resentment.155  
                                                                
145Id.   
146Id. at 143.  
147Id. at 146-147. 
148Id.  
149Id. at 146.  
150Brener, 671 F.2d at 147.  
151Id. at 146, 147 (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 85).  
152See id. at 146.  
153See id. at 147.  
154See Allen and Brushwood, supra note 87, at 8-9.  
155Id. at 8.  
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For example, a pharmacist who opposes abortion but gives priority to her 
professional duty to the patient (and thus would prescribe such drugs in spite of her 
personal conscience) could come to resent the objecting pharmacist who refuses to 
dispense abortion drugs.156   
The above examples are not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all the 
possible situations in which accommodating an objecting pharmacist could result in 
an undue burden.  Instead they are intended to illustrate the uncertainty and 
inconsistency of pharmaceutical conscience protection under Title VII.  Also, 
because it is uncertain that a pharmacist is protected under Title VII, the statute may 
not deter employers from firing or demoting conscientious pharmacists, thus placing 
the affirmative burden on the pharmacist to protect her rights.  Further, Title VII 
offers no protection against civil suits against the pharmacist, and no direct immunity 
from professional discipline. 
B.  Wrongful Discharge 
The conscientious pharmacist may also have a remedy through the common law 
tort of wrongful discharge.157  Wrongful discharge is an exception to the employment 
at will doctrine in that if the employee’s discharge conflicts with a recognized public 
policy, then the employer may be liable in tort.158  Two main reasons exist as to why 
a wrongful discharge claim provides weak protection for the conscientious 
pharmacist.  One, it is uncertain at best whether a state would recognize a public 
policy protecting the right to conscience.  Also, in most cases where a pharmacist is 
fired for following her conscience, the reason for the discharge is not necessarily 
because her conscience was followed, but rather that doing so was detrimental to the 
business.       
The definition of public policy varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and is 
constantly evolving and changing in time.159  In any event, where a discharge may be 
found to violate public policy is generally limited to four categories: “refusing to 
engage in illegal activity at the behest of the employer; exercising a public duty; 
asserting a legal right or privilege; or whistleblowing.”160  In the pharmaceutical 
context, for a wrongful discharge claim to be viable, public policy must recognize a 
right of conscience, that is, a right to refuse accommodating the distribution of 
abortion drugs.161  Thus, a wrongful discharge claim would likely fall within the 
“asserting a legal right or privilege” category.  However, the courts have recognized 
a discharge as violative of public policy under this category in limited circumstances, 
                                                                
156Id. at 9.  
15782 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 11 (2000).   
158Id.  
159See id. § 14; Bruce G. Davis, Defining the Employment Rights of Medical Personnel 
Within the Parameters of Personal Conscience, 1986 DETROIT C.L. REV. 847, 852. 
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161See Davis, supra note 159, at 851-52.  
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and a right to conscience has not been among them.162  Further, some courts have 
expressly rejected assertions of public policy where the employee’s conduct served 
and was motivated by personal or private interests.163 
Even if a court recognized a public policy against firing an employee who 
follows her conscience, in the context of pharmaceutical care, a wrongful discharge 
claim would still probably fail.  In Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.,164 the Ohio 
Supreme Court, based on review of cases throughout the country, outlined the 
elements necessary to the analysis of a wrongful discharge claim.165  One of the 
elements included that the “employer lacked [an] overriding legitimate business 
justification for the dismissal[.]”166  Where a pharmacist fails to accommodate a 
patient’s valid prescription for legal drugs, deemed safe by the patient’s doctor, the 
employer may have legitimate business justifications for dismissing the 
pharmacist.167  The refusal to accommodate could result in low morale among the co-
workers, patient dissatisfaction with service, or even lost profits.  All of these are 
clearly detrimental to a business, and thus may prevent a recovery for wrongful 
discharge even in light of a court-recognized public policy favoring a right to follow 
one’s conscience. 
The preceding is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of whether a wrongful 
discharge claim would protect a pharmacist.  In fact, it may be that existing 
conscience clause statutes could provide a powerful basis for a public policy against 
discharge for conscientious refusal to accommodate.168  However, in the absence of 
clear law on the subject, results are uncertain at best.  Because of the uncertainty, 
                                                                
162The exercise of certain legal rights is often a prohibited basis of discharge.  These 
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164677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997).  
165Id. at 321-22. 
166Id.; see also McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 696 A.2d 173, 178 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (where an employee’s constant complaints to her employer about an alleged 
health hazard in the workplace constituted a disruption of the orderly management of the 
business, and thus such complaints by the employee constituted a legitimate justification for 
discharge).  
167See supra Section IV.A.  
168See supra note 162 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 170-173 (citing current 
conscience statutes).   
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wrongful discharge may not deter employers from firing or demoting conscientious 
pharmacists, thus placing the affirmative burden on the pharmacist to protect her 
rights.  Further, wrongful discharge offers no protection against civil liability and no 
direct immunity from professional discipline. 
C.  Current State Conscience Clause Statutes 
Currently, forty-five jurisdictions in the United States offer some statutory 
protection of the consciences of health care professionals.169  The legislative acts 
generally recognize a right to refuse participating in controversial procedures on 
account of moral or religious grounds and articulate certain remedies and 
prohibitions designed to protect the right of conscience.  However, only South 
Dakota provides conscience legislation specific to pharmacists170 and Illinois has 
enacted a comprehensive conscience statute that protects against recriminatory action 
against any medical personnel for refusing to act contrary to their conscience, thus 
encompassing pharmacists in the context of EC distribution.171  As nearly all 
conscience statutes were enacted without regard to pharmacists, these statutes are 
deficient in the context of pharmaceutical distribution of reproductive medications in 
both their scope and protection.  
The great majority of current conscience clauses protect a right to refuse to 
participate in “abortion.”172  A few states specifically include a right to refuse to 
participate in contraception procedures within their conscience laws,173 thus 
including EC within its scope.  Most of these “contraception-inclusive statutes” are 
                                                                
169See infra notes 170-173.  
170S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (Michie 1998).  
171ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 et seq. (West 1993).  
172See ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (Michie 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 (1993); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2000); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-16 (Michie 2001); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (Michie 2000); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-4 to 7 (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 1997); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 65-443 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (Baldwin 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1299.31 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 112, § 12I (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 333.21081-84 (West 2001); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.414, 145.42 (West 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (West 1996); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-337 to 341 (2000); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 632.475 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1 to 3 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
30-5-2 (Michie 2001); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-
45.1 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 
(Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
3213 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40 , 50 
(Law. Co-op. 2001); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001-003 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-7-306 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.09 (West 
2001); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1988). 
173See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-304(4)-(5) (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-
102(9) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 
(2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 
(1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2000); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2001). 
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limited in their protection to either government personnel174 or private sector 
personnel,175 while only a few protect any person, and not just private or public 
sector individuals.176 
The problem with the “abortion-only statutes” is that they may not include EC.177  
This is illustrated in a California appellate case where the court held that EC 
“constitutes ‘prevention,’ i.e., birth control, rather than ‘termination,’ i.e., abortion” 
thus precluding the application of the California conscience clause to a Catholic 
hospital’s refusal to disclose information about EC.178  Further, most statutes define 
“abortion” as the “termination of a human pregnancy”179 without defining 
“pregnancy.”  Thus, it is likely that scientific definitions of when pregnancy 
commences (at implantation of the blastocyst)180 will control, leaving EC void of 
coverage under most conscience legislation. 
A further problem with abortion-only statutes is that they protect against 
participation or assistance in abortion.181  Thus, if a pharmacist were successful in 
persuading a court that EC should be included within the definition of abortion, 
another hurdle would arise.  The pharmacist would still have to convince the court 
that dispensing of EC is a form of participation or assistance in abortion.  Some 
interpreters of conscience laws may conclude that the pharmacist’s dispensing of 
drugs is too far removed an act to qualify as participation, performance, assistance, 
or provision of abortion.  In fact, the Iowa Attorney General opined that a pharmacist 
who prepares the saline solution used in abortions is not performing or assisting in 
abortions.182  Thus, it is unclear at best whether pharmacists who refuse to dispense 
EC would be considered significant enough actors in the abortion or EC process to 
be protected under many conscience clause statutes. 
Under the statutes that unquestionably protect the pharmacist in the context of 
distributing EC,183 other limitations on the pharmacist’s right to refuse may exist, 
                                                                
174See GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2001); Id. § 49-7-2; OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 (1999); W. 
VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2000). 
175See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102(9) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 1903(4) (West 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001). 
176See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (Michie 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) 
(West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2001). 
177See supra Section II.B. 
178Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989). 
179See, e.g., OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.11 (Anderson 2001).  
180See supra Section II.B.2.  
181See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 (1993) (protecting against “participat[ion] in the 
medical or surgical procedures which will result in…abortion”); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 
(Michie 2000) (protecting against “the performance or provision of any abortion”); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 16-34-1-4 to 7 (West 1997) (protecting refusal to “perform an abortion or to assist or 
participate in…an abortion”).   
1821976 Op. Att’y Gen. 478 (Iowa Attorney General opinion March 1, 1976). 
183See supra note 173.  
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such as protecting the right to refuse only to the extent the pharmacist refuses to 
dispense.184  A referral to another pharmacist could be considered separate and 
unrelated to participation in abortion, and thus a refusal to refer would not be 
protected against recriminatory action.  For many pharmacists referral would be no 
less in conflict with their moral convictions than actually distributing ECPs.185 
In fact, only four jurisdictions’ conscience legislation includes protection of a 
pharmacist’s right to refuse to furnish or provide “information” about contraceptive 
therapy.186  A pharmacist who refuses to refer a patient to another pharmacist could 
argue that a referral is the provision or furnishing of “information” about EC, and 
thus refusing to refer is protected under these statutes.  However, if a pharmacist was 
successful making such an argument, the protection provided under these four 
statutes is limited to protection against civil tort liability.187  The pharmacist’s 
employer would not be prevented from discharging the refusing pharmacist, nor 
would a state pharmacy board be precluded from initiating disciplinary action if it so 
desired.188 
The ambiguity of and improbability that current conscience statutes apply in the 
pharmaceutical context to all possible objections a pharmacist may have regarding 
certain abortion and contraceptive drugs provides a flimsy foundation on which to 
enable a pharmacist to avoid contradicting her moral convictions.  A pharmacist who 
does follow her conscience by either refusing to distribute or refusing to refer is at 
the mercy of a judge’s interpretation of the jurisdiction’s respective conscience 
statute, and it is not unlikely that such statutes will be interpreted narrowly.189  
Further, many conscience statutes are confined regarding what they protect against, 
precluding even a sympathetic judiciary from protecting the pharmacist from all of 
the various possible consequences of following her conscience.190  Moreover, the 
pharmacist should not have to depend on after-the-fact judicial measures to ensure 
she will not be punished for following her morals.  Law and policy that clearly 
recognize the potential moral dilemmas of pharmacists and accordingly provide 
broad protection of conscience would put customers and employers on notice so as to 
accommodate all.  Current conscience statutes fail in this regard. 
VI.  SECTION V:  SOLUTION 
Legal protection must serve two purposes in order to appropriately ensure a 
pharmacist’s right of conscientious refusal: 1) prevent and deter detrimental 
recriminatory action against the pharmacist; and 2) provide adequate remedies in the 
                                                                
184See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (West 1992) (protecting one’s right to 
refuse to “provide” contraception). 
185See supra Section II.C. 
186See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4)-(5) (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-
102(9) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-
104(5) (2001).  
187Id.   
188Id.  
189See supra notes 178 and 182. 
190See supra note 181.  
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case that the pharmacist is sued or disciplined.  The most efficient and effective 
means to these ends is the enactment of state and federal legislation. 
The first step to successful enactment of pharmacist conscience legislation in 
each state and the United States is the cooperation of local, regional, and national 
pharmaceutical associations.  The American Pharmaceutical Association took a large 
positive step when it adopted its pharmacist conscience clause.191  However, in the 
same pronouncement it rejected adoption of a policy encouraging enactment of state 
and national legal protection of the right of conscience.192  If pharmacists themselves, 
as represented by their professional associations and organizations, do not call for 
state and national legislative action, the road to adequate protection will be more 
difficult.193 
In any event, an effective conscience statute should take into consideration many 
complex issues including broad protection against recriminatory action, efficient 
administration of pharmacies, and accommodation of patients.  First and foremost 
the conscience clause should serve its purpose stating clearly that no pharmacist shall 
be required to dispense abortion or EC drugs, nor shall any pharmacist be required to 
refer to another pharmacist who will dispense abortion or EC drugs.194  Although 
pharmacists currently have no role in the distribution of mifepristone,195 the abortion 
language should nonetheless be included as the potential for future pharmaceutical 
access exists.196  Next, the conscience statute should prohibit discrimination, civil 
liability, and professional disciplinary action that result from exercising the 
aforementioned rights of refusal.197  The statute should also encompass provisions 
                                                                
191See supra note 96.  
192American Pharmaceutical Association, Report of the House Delegates, Rejected Policy 
Proposals, available at http://www.aphanet.org/lead/hod.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).  The 
APhA rejected a policy of urging “adoption of state laws and regulations authorizing a 
pharmacist’s conscience clause.”  Id. 
193At least one state pharmaceutical association has adopted a conscience clause that 
recognizes the pharmacist’s right to refuse dispensing and referring.  Angela Bonavoglia, Co-
opting Conscience: The Dangerous Evolution of Conscience Clauses in American Health 
Policy, PROCHOICE RESOURCE CENTER (ProChoice Matters series, Port Chester, N.Y.), Jan. 
1999, at 4; http://www.prochoiceresource.org/about/CoopConsc.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 
2004).  The Pharmacists Society of the State of New York adopted a refuse to dispense and 
refuse to refer clause in 1998.  Id. 
194As South Dakota is the only state with a pharmacist conscience clause, it provides an 
example of how the language would appear.  The first sentence of South Dakota’s 
pharmaceutical conscience clause states that “[n]o pharmacist may be required to dispense 
medication if there is reason to believe that the medication would be used to: (1) Cause an 
abortion; or (2) Destroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(50A)[.]”  S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (Michie 1998).  “Unborn child” is defined as “an individual 
organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.”  Id. § 22-1-2(50A).  
Thus, EC is included in the conscience clause, but no explicit right to refuse referral exists. 
195See supra Section II.B  
196See supra Section II.B. 
197
“No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section may be the basis for 
any claim for damages against the pharmacist or pharmacy of the pharmacist or the basis for 
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prohibiting discrimination in the hiring process so as to preclude pharmacy-
employers from screening applicants to avoid hiring pro-life pharmacists in the first 
place.198  Finally, the statute should provide adequate methods of deterrence.  
Employment discrimination could be deterred through its criminalization or by 
providing an express cause of action in tort as a remedy to the discriminatory hiring, 
firing, demotion, or promotion of pharmacists. 
Employer and patient considerations should also exist in a pharmacist conscience 
clause.  Prior notification of a pharmacist’s beliefs regarding abortion and EC should 
be disclosed to the employer so as to enable efficient administration of the pharmacy.  
Further, patients should be put on notice in advance regarding when pharmacists 
with moral objections to abortion and EC will be on duty.  For example, schedules 
could be posted conspicuously within a pharmacy as to when abortion and EC drugs 
will and will not be available to customer-patients.  This will enable patients to avoid 
the hassle of going to a pharmacy and having their prescription refused.  In any 
event, matters such as the aforementioned should be considered when drafting a 
pharmacist conscience clause. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Pharmacists, like other professionals such as physicians and attorneys, have a 
general duty to ensure their client’s best interests, and thus must put the health of 
patients above all other considerations.199  Thus, it would seem to follow, when a 
pharmacist is presented with a valid prescription of what is safe for the patient to 
consume, the drugs should be distributed without dispute.  However, to require that a 
pharmacist, or any professional, participate in what she would equate to the taking of 
a human life should never be a principle of professional ethics. 
Certain issues, because of their inherent complexity and ambiguity, must be 
resolved, with guidance from religion, philosophy, and science, in the heart and mind 
of each individual.  The commencement of human life and the relative sanctity of 
unborn life are issues that fall within this category of subjective individual 
determination.  The thoughtful decision should be respected and free from vilifying 
recrimination.  If a pharmacist, in her heart of hearts, concludes that accommodating 
prescriptions for abortive and EC medications is akin to directly facilitating the 
destruction of a precious human life, a refusal to accommodate such prescriptions 
should be protected under the law and within the profession.  A safeguard of the 
right to refuse is imminently necessary as abortive drugs and EC become more 
widespread and risk of liability and loss of employment may compel many 
pharmacists to disregard their sacred beliefs or reap the consequences of their 
objections.  Proactive acceptance of a pharmacist’s conscientious objection to 
abortion and EC within the pharmaceutical community would pave the way to 
legislative protection already afforded doctors and nurses.200   
                                                          
any disciplinary, recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the pharmacist.” S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (Michie 1998).    
198Title VII prohibits discrimination in hiring practices.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) 
(“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse to 
hire…”).    
199See supra Section III.C.  
200See supra Section V.C.  
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